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 1 Introduction
Interactions and knowledge exchanges, both among rms and other insti-
tutions (such as, for example, universities and research labs), are at the
heart of the innovation process. This is one of the starting points of the neo-
schumpeterian and evolutionary analysis of technological change, in which
the role of interdependence has been founded on such notions as \producer-
user relationships" (von Hippel, 1976), \learning-by-interacting" (Lundvall,
1992), \knowledge division" (Loasby, 2000), \community of practice" (Lave
and Wenger, 1991), just to mention a few.1
Interactions have been recently brought to the front of the debate in
innovation studies, also and above all because of their role in explaining such
important phenomena as \innovation clusters" and \systems of innovations".
Although developed quite independently, these two concepts have recently
come to overlap substantially. However, this overlapping has mainly con-
cerned the clustering of innovations in the territorial space, such as for the
idea of regional system of innovation (e.g. Cooke et al., 1997). Conversely,
it has gone somehow neglected with respect to another important kind of
clustering, in what can be called the techno-economic space, in brief:
not [a] topographical, geographical space but [...] an abstract
economic space of supply and demand of dierent goods (as
represented by input-output matrices) and [a] technical space
(as represented by the techno-functional classication of patents)
(DeBresson, 1996d, p.151).2
In this paper we intend to ll this gap by showing that the nature and
the number of innovation clusters one can identify in the techno-economic
space can be used to analyze the structure of their hosting technological
systems (TSs). In particular, as we will do in the paper, by investigating
the patterns of innovation clustering in dierent TSs, and by looking for
techno-economic clusters which can be qualied as \reduced TSs" (ReTSs)
for them.
This kind of analysis is carried out with respect to 15 OECD countries
for the middle '90s. More precisely, by drawing on, but also expanding
substantially, the methodology of previous works on the issue (e.g. Leoncini
1The innovation role of interdependence has been recognized also by standard neo-
classical accounts, in which it has been founded on dierent concepts such as those of
\externalities" and \spillovers". However, these concepts reect a methodological indi-
vidualism which somehow clashes with the idea of interdependence itself. As Christian
DeBresson observed: \Only if one assumes totally free individual economic agents with
no stable external relationships, joint interests, joint constraints, or commitments can the
concept of externality make sense." (DeBresson, 1996a, p.76).
2To be sure, for both theoretical and practical reasons (on which see Leoncini and
Montresor, 2000b), in this paper the \technical" side of the techno-economic space will be
rather represented by the sectoral classication of R&D expenditure.
2and Montresor, 2003c), their TSs are compared through specic network
analysis techniques applied to qualied matrices of intersectoral innovation
ows.
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 explores the idea
of innovation clustering in the techno-economic space and its relationship
with the notion of TS. Section 3 details the network analysis techniques
used in the application and emphasizes important dierences with respect to
previous applications. Section 4 illustrates the main results of the comparative
application. Section 5 concludes.
2 Innovation clusters in technological systems
2.1 Innovation clusters in the techno-economic space
The spatial clustering of innovations has been recognized as a central feature
of advanced national economies (e.g. Porter, 2000), and thus investigated
by several theoretical positions. Relative less attention has been instead
attracted by another kind of interdependence, which manifests itself through
the clustering of innovation activities in the techno-economic space. This
can be meant as the (abstract) reference space originated by the interaction
of two dimensions: on the one hand, the meso-economic mechanisms of
innovation inducement represented by the intersectoral relationships of an
economic system; on the other hand, the meso-technological constraints and
opportunities determined by the sectoral distribution of the innovative eorts
and outcomes of an innovation system (DeBresson, 1996d; Leoncini and
Montresor, 2003a). Such a space is thus the \bi-dimensional" one which
emerges by mapping the innovation process at the intersectoral level.
Innovation clustering in this techno-economic space has a manifold the-
oretical explanation. On the one hand, it is grounded on the idea that
input-output coecients, and the related backward and forward linkages,
represent the inverse of an economic kind of distance between rms (of
dierent sectors), which crucially aects their \learning-by-interacting" and
the entailed knowledge networks: the greater an intersectoral coecient is,
the closer the related sectors are in economic terms, the more the relative
rms are able to engage in network kinds of relationships which increase
their innovative opportunities (Lundvall, 1992; DeBresson, 1996c). On the
other hand, \techno-economic clustering" relies on the idea that input-output
matrices map intersectoral ows of goods (both intermediate and capital) and
services which shape the intersectoral diusion of innovation: both directly,
that is by channeling embodied innovation ows, and indirectly, that is by
driving disembodied technology ows (Marengo and Sterlacchini, 1990).
Of course, those forces which drive the spatial and the techno-economic
clustering of innovations can be at work simultaneously and possibly rein-
force each other (DeBresson, 1996b). However, two rms operating in the
3same sector are economically close even if they are geographically dispersed.
Therefore, spatial clustering does not represent a necessary pre-requisite for
techno-economic clustering, and the relative techno-economic space can be
deemed territorially neutral.
For this reason, the present paper will focus on the techno-economic
space identied by national input-output tables, once sectoral innovative
eorts are distributed along them consistently.3
2.2 The techno-economic relationships of a technological
system
The role of interactions for the innovative process, and that of institutions
enabling them (Edquist and Johnson, 1997; Johnson, 1992), are crucial in
the massive literature on the systems of innovations (Edquist and McKelvey,
2000).
Among the numerous system concepts which have been put forward, in
this paper we will refer to a broad notion of technological system (Leoncini,
1998; Leoncini and Montresor, 2003b) which combines institutional elements
with other elements for which the functional (i.e. sectoral) boundaries of an
economy { that is the techno-economic space { are at least as important as
the geographical ones { that is the territorial space. One of the distinguishing
features of this notion is that the relationships occurring in the \techno-
economic space" are crucial in investigating the functioning of the TS sub-
systems and of the TS as a whole (Leoncini and Montresor, 2003c). In
particular, the techno-economic relationships of this TS can be proxied with
the R&D ows circulating among its economic sectors being embodied in their
vertically integrated relationships. And, given the way they are measured,
these ows can actually be deemed techno-economic in nature and shaped
by the constitutive sub-systems of the broad notion of TS we are referring
to (Leoncini and Montresor, 2003a).4
As has been shown in a number of studies (e.g. Leoncini et al., 1996;
3Although the techno-economic space spans across the boundaries of one country,
referring to national input-output tables can be motivated on the basis of two arguments.
First, super-national input-output matrices are not yet available to carry out systematic
empirical analysis, while measuring international innovation relationships embodied in
intersectoral import ows suers from important methodological problems (Leoncini and
Montresor, 2003a). Second, even in the globalisation era, important dierences emerge
among countries in the way the innovative process takes place and is organized at various
levels of analysis.
4R&D ows embodied in intersectoral production ows reect, by denition, the
functioning of both the innovative sub-system (proxied by R&D expenditure) and the
production sub-system (proxied by input-output tables) of a TS. Furthermore, the resort
to the notion of vertically integrated sectors allows the same ows to retain also the market
sub-system through the role of nal demand. As has been argued elsewhere (Leoncini
and Montresor, 2005), the map can be rened by considering, still in an input-output
framework, the role of the foreign market and of the institutional set-up.
4Leoncini and Montresor, 2000b, 2001, 2005; Chang and Shih, 2005), the TSs of
dierent countries, both at the macro and the sectoral level, can be compared
by applying specic network analysis techniques to these techno-economic
ows. In the present paper we argue that, with some important additions
and specications, the same methodology can be used also in investigating
how innovations cluster in the techno-economic space of dierent TSs. To
these methodological specications we turn in the next section.
3 Intersectoral innovation ows and network
analysis: \some new wine in an old bottle"
3.1 Direct and indirect innovation ows
Drawing on Leoncini and Montresor (2003c), the constitutive relationships of
the techno-economic space of a TS can be mapped by building up a (n  n)
matrix R dened as:
(1) R = ^ r ^ q 1(I   A) 1 ^ y
where ^ r, ^ q, and ^ y are the sectoral diagonal vectors of, respectively, R&D
expenditures, gross production and nal demand, and (I   A) 1 is the
Leontief inverse based on the domestic input-output coecients matrix (A).
With respect to previous applications, the use of the R matrix in de-
tecting techno-economic clusters now requires us to distinguish and consider
both direct and indirect intersectoral R&D ows. This is necessary as the in-
tersectoral innovation diusion process represented by R, although assuming
sectoral intermediation in production, does not allow for sectoral intermedia-
tion in innovation. In a \stylized" TS made up of three economic sectors {
namely, metal products (sector i), non-electrical machinery (sector k) and
automobiles (sector j) { rij measures the innovation made by the metal
products sector (sector i) which the automobile sector (sector j) acquires
from it: both directly { that is embodied in the instruments it acquires from
the metal products sector itself (sector i) { and indirectly { that is embodied
in the instruments (still produced by sector i) used to produce those machines
the automobile sector (sector j) gets from the non-electrical machinery one
(sector k). However, although \intermediated" by the production of the
machinery sector (i.e. by sector k), the innovation the automobile sector
(sector j) receives via rij is produced by the metal sector (sector i) only:
that is, rij does not admit that the machinery sector (sector k) could in turn
innovate the metal products (sector i) it uses to produce those machines
which are then bought by the automobile sector (sector j).
Therefore, the analysis of the total techno-economic ows occurring
between two generic sectors i and j of R requires us to consider two kinds of
ows. First, we should consider the innovation generated by i and transferred,
5through direct and direct \production ows", to j, that is rij. Second, we
have also to take into account those \intermediate" sectors ks which receive
embodied R&D by i and transfer their embodied R&D to j, still through
both direct and indirect production ows.
Once direct and indirect innovation ows have been disentangled, the
kind of clusterization they entail can be investigated by applying two net-
work analysis techniques which are usually adopted in studying grouping
phenomena in social sciences. As we will show, both have an interesting
interpretative meaning with respect to the present issue.
3.2 Network analysis and clusterization patterns in
technological systems
Before identifying the actual number and nature of groups in a certain
network, by means of Social Network Analysis we can investigate which
model of clusterization better ts the relationships { technically called \arcs"
{ which are observed among its components { \vertices" or \nodes" { regardless
of the prospective number of groups.
Drawing on the hypotheses and the testing procedures about patterns
of aective relations coming from social psychology and generally known as
balance theory, a set of models have been formalized in order to identify the
structure that networks reveal in terms of relationships within and between
groups.5 In their economic applications, these balance-theoretic models are
possibly less popular than others. In particular, than those which, by means
of the so called \generalized blockmodeling" (Doreian et al., 2005), look for
a \core-periphery" structure often envisaged also in (territorial) systems of
innovation. However, the analysis of \triads" { groups of three vertices and
the lines between them { on which balance-theoretic models are based, is
less demanding of hypotheses than generalized blockmodeling, instead based
on the analysis of \contingency matrices" { matrices of 1s and 0s denoting,
respectively, the presence and the absence of a relationship between couples
of vertices. What is more, balance-theoretic models allow us to search in TSs
a dierent set of congurations for its techno-economic activities. Indeed, as
we will argue, the main models of this kind have a quite interesting equivalent
in the way a TS is organized when the techno-economic relationships among
its sectors are considered.
Following Holland and Leinhardt (1970, 1971, 1975), we can refer to two
groups of models. The rst group investigates how well the hypothesis of
\cohesive groups" with no \external" relationships ts the actual data. In
5In brief, the basic idea is that a person feels uncomfortable if there are \negative"
relations with other persons belonging to his group (hostility, disliking or disagreement
on some topics). Such feelings make disorganized networks balance into cohesive groups
among which either no or hierarchical relationships establish. For an overview of these
balance-theoretic models see Wasserman and Faust (1994, Ch.6).
6particular, two models can be tested.
(i) Balanced model. Observed networks are confronted with a hypothetical
one made up of two large, very dense clusters, among which there are
no ties. In formal terms, the candidate network structure is made up
of no more than two \cliques", where a clique is a maximal complete
subnetwork containing three vertices or more.
(ii) Clusterability model. The hypothesis is tested that actual networks
are made up of a certain number n of clusters (n > 2), still with very
dense internal relationships and no external relationships. Formally,
the model relaxes the assumption of two cliques of the balanced one,
and allows networks to consist of more cliques.
The second group of models tests the hypothesis that cohesive groups can
emerge in a network also by developing relationships among them, namely
of hierarchical nature. Unlike within-cluster relationships, among-clusters
ones are in fact assumed to be \asymmetric"{ technically, the connecting
lines have one direction only. Accordingly, they can reveal a \superiority" of
higher ranked clusters with respect to lower ranked clusters. More precisely,
three models of this kind can be tested:
(iii) Ranked clusters model. The model-network is assumed composed of a
number of clusters, which are ranked in such a way that each vertex in
a lower ranked cluster is connected in an asymmetric way with each one
of the vertices in a higher cluster. Given that higher ranked clusters'
vertices reach directly each of the vertices of all the lower ranked ones,
in a sort of cascade, the kind of ranking this model assumes is thus
quite strict.
(iv) Transitivity model. As in the previous model, the hypothesis is that
network's clusters develop a hierarchy by means of asymmetric dyads {
couple of vertices and their connecting tie { among them. This time,
however, the inherent ranking is admitted to be looser. Higher ranked
clusters are in fact retained to be so even in the absence of direct ties
toward the vertices of lower ranked ones, providing indirect ties { that
is passing through intermediate ranked clusters { can be traced with
respect to them. In formal terms, the only requirement to identify
relations among clusters of dierent ranks is for them to be at least
transitive.
(v) Hierarchical  M-clusters model. Looser ties are assumed and tested not
only among clusters { as in the previous model { but also within them.
Clusters are in fact admitted to be made also by asymmetric dyads,
providing they still allow cyclic relationships to be identied for them
which make their rank recognizable.
7As a \null hypothesis" with respect to the previous ve models, a sixth
one can be tested:
(vi) No balance-theoretic model. The way in which vertices are linked
together does not t any balance-theoretic model and it is therefore not
possible to cluster or rank the actual vertices and arcs of a network.
As we said, once a TS is thought as a network of sectors linked by techno-
economic relationships { i.e. intersectoral embodied R&D ows { these six
models can be read as six dierent ways in which a TS can be organized. A
\balanced-model", for example, would suggest a dichotomic TS, marked by
the presence of two independent sub-systems of innovation, resembling what
has been identied by a more qualitative and institutional oriented literature
(e.g. Malerba, 1993). A TS organized according to the \clusterability model"
would instead suggest the co-existence of several unrelated \technological
trajectories" (Leoncini and Montresor, 2000a). The \ranked clusters", the
\transitivity" and the \hierarchical  M-clusters" models are suggestive of
\complex" (Potts, 2000) TSs , in which subsystems of dierent importance
(i.e. rank) can be identied and organized into progressively less \complete"
hierarchies. Finally, a TS network tted by a no balance-theoretic model
would signal an \atomistic" TS, whose constituent sectors do not further
organize into sub-systems.
Once the actual clusterization pattern of a TS has been identied among
these six, and we should stress endogenously, actual clusters can also be
detected by assuming an adequate hypothesis about the way relationships
occur within them. A crucial issue we will address in the next section.
3.3 Symmetric Acyclic Decomposition (SAD) analysis and
\Reduced Technological Systems" (ReTS)
The working hypothesis on the basis of which we identify clusters in TSs is
that of \strong components" (SC), obtained by applying a weak version of
the Symmetric-Acyclic Decomposition (SAD) method (Doreian et al., 2000).
In intuitive terms, SCs can be dened as maximal sub-networks of nodes
(here sectors) among which the connecting arcs (here techno-economic ows)
determine a cyclical relationship, so that a hierarchy cannot be established
among them.6 While a SC is a cyclic (sub)network by denition, vertices
6The SAD method is grounded on Davis and Leinhardt"s (1972) idea of ranked clusters
models. In formal terms, given a directed graph G = (V;E), that is, a set of vertices (or
nodes or points) (V ) and a set of ordered pairs of these vertices specifying their relations
(E), a strong component of G can be formally dened as the maximal subset of vertices
P  G such that there is a directed path within P from x to y for each pair fx;yg 2 P. A
path from x1 to xk is a graph M = (Z;F) of the form:
Z = fx1;x2;:::xkg F = fx1x2;x2x3;:::xk 1xkg
where x1;x2;:::xk are all distinct (Diestel, 2005).
8which are not a part of a strong component cannot belong to a cycle. Thus,
if we \shrink" the SCs of a network, and make them of one node each, the
network becomes ipso facto acyclic, that is, strongly hierarchical: its vertices
and SCs can thus be ranked accordingly.
The rationale of this choice is given by the search of clusters which have
a truly system nature, and can thus be qualied as \reduced-form" systems:
in our case, \Reduced Technological Systems" (ReTSs).7 It seems to us
that the concept of SC actually contains the rationale to operationalize
quantitatively the idea of ReTSs. Indeed, what attributes to a cluster of
sectors an actual system nature, and makes of it a ReTS within a TS, is
the presence of heterarchical relationships among its constitutive elements:
a condition that the cyclical nature of the SC relationships guarantees by
denition. Accordingly, a SC describes a cluster as systemic, given that
its functioning is distributed among its components (sectors), rather than
polarized and dependent on some of them more than on others.
To identify a ReTS with a SC is for sure a stringent criterion, which
excludes \simpler" compositions of elementary structures addressed by other
cluster techniques, such as \technological complexes" and \simple agglomer-
ations" (DeBresson et al., 1996). On the other hand, a SC is less stringently
dened than a \clique", where all the participating sectors supply each other
with their techno-economic outputs (DeBresson et al., 1996). In other words,
a SC which is also a clique qualies a ReTS as systemic to the maximum
extent. Therefore, comparing dierent TSs on the basis of their innovative
cliques is also important.
4 An empirical application to 15 OECD
technological systems for the middle '90s
As in other previous works, network analysis is here applied to an appropriate
transformation of R (n  n), C (n  n): a matrix which neutralizes scale
dierences across dierent TSs and neglects intrasectoral innovation ows
by referring to normalized intersectoral innovative acquisitions (Leoncini
and Montresor, 2000b). More precisely, the C matrices are here built up
by matching two OECD datasets: the \new" OECD Input-Output Database
(2005), containing consistent input-output tables at current prices for 20
7The term \reduced-form" is here borrowed from the modeling community and refers
to a \respecied system of endogenous relationships that permit one to grasp system
essential, identify their key function, or to derive practical ndings" (OECD, 2001, p.14).
The importance of \reduced-systems" for innovation systems of national scale has been
recently suggested by the well-known OECD program on the issue (OECD, 1999, 2001),
which denes them, in inner techno-economic terms, as: \the most essential and functional
system elements [which] stimulate the emergence of specic kinds of innovation in various
segments of a national economy" (OECD, 2001, p.8, emphasis ours). The kind of space
reduced-systems refer to is thus in fact a techno-economic, rather than a territorial one.
9countries and 41 sectors with respect to the middle '90s, and the OECD AN-
BERD (Analytical Business Enterprise Research and Development) Database
(2005), on which data on sectoral R&D expenditure have been drawn for the
correspondent countries and years. The numerous blanks in the series of the
latter dataset have forced us to limit our empirical application to 15 coun-
tries (Appendix A) and 16 sectors only, out of which 15 are manufacturing
(including constructions) and one a service sector (Appendix B).
Before presenting the results a methodological clarication is important.
The countries of the dataset are quite dierent among them. Not only in terms
of size and R&D intensity, but also and above all when their national systems
of innovations are compared. Although we are aware of these macroscopic
dierences, in the following we will try to show whether systematic dierences
and similarities emerge among them when the techno-economic space of their
TS is explored in the same way: that is, by looking for and characterizing
techno-economic clusters which can be deemed reduced-TSs.
4.1 To start with: dichotomization and density
As the majority of the network analysis techniques, also those we will use
in the paper require us to work with dichotomic matrices: in our case,
dichotomized C matrices, made up of 1s and 0s according to a \greater-than"
test of cij with respect to a certain cut-o value, t. Given the sensitivity
of the results to the threshold value (t), its choice has to be carried out
cautiously, especially in comparative exercises. Accordingly, in the following
we stick to Leoncini and Montresor (2000b) and choose it on the basis of the
density (Dt) the TSs compared reveal for a large set of cut-o values.
Dened as the ratio between the actual number of cells of C (sC) which
are greater than t, and the maximum number of cells of the same matrix
(n(n   1)), Dt informs us about the role of t in shaping the structure of the
correspondent TS-network.8 Therefore, the TS-sensitivity to dichotomization
can be explored by examining the density distribution (dt) a certain TS (i.e.
its \mirrored" C) shows with respect to a suitable vector of cut-o values
t.9 In the following, the density of the 15 TSs is compared with respect to
a \super-vector" of cut-os (tZ) whose Z elements are obtained by ordering
the cells of all the 15 matrices C (Z = (15  16)  15 = 36000).10
8The TS's arcs are in fact valued by the cells of C itself. In formal terms, Dt =
sC
n(n 1)
with 0  Dt  1.
9In Leoncini and Montresor (2000b), for example, t is the ordered distribution of the
cells of the correspondent matrix C, so that the density of a certain TS is maximum (and
equal to 1) and minimum (and equal to 0) when the cut-os are, respectively, the minimum
and the maximum of its constitutive techno-economic ows.
10In Leoncini and Montresor (2000b), instead, a reference tz is chosen (arbitrarily) out
of the z matrices C to be compared, and with respect to it the density of all the other
(z  1) TSs is then worked out. In the comparison, the density distribution of the reference
country-TS (dtz) turns out linear and the other TSs can be qualied as relatively more
10Unfortunately, for an as large set of cut-os, very few general trends
can be identied across the all 15 TSs. However, interesting insights can
be obtained by grouping them according to the similarity of their density
distribution. In this last respect, Figure 1 shows ve groups of TSs whose
density distributions are \non-linear", or at least not as linear as those of
a sixth group, made up of Canada, Germany and the UK (Figure 1(a)).
With respect to the 15 TSs investigated, these three thus have an average
degree of connectivity. However, they are also the most \homogeneous", as
considering small rather than large techno-economic ows does not make
them recovering or loosing many positions in the ranking according to the
highest density.
In the other 12 TSs, instead, the size of the retained techno-economic
ows aects their relative density with dierent patterns. The \upward-
downward concavity" path shared by France and Italy (Figure 1(b)), for
example, shows that by retaining also very small and small techno-economic
ows, respectively, France and Italy are in fact the least dense, while they
turn into the most dense when large and very large ows only are retained.
This is quite interesting and suggestive of a sort of dichotomy in the same
TSs, which at least for Italy has been also documented by other sources
(Malerba, 1993). The previous pattern is contrasted by the \downward-
upward concavity" one shown by Australia and Japan (Figure 1(c)), which
both have widespread intersectoral techno-economic linkages, although many
of these are somewhat \secondary" and become null for large cut-os (a
similar path is revealed by Finland and Norway (Figure 1(d))).
Among the other groups, a special attention deserves that identied
by three TSs that in the retained period have displayed quite remarkable
innovative performances and distinguished for important transformations in
the relative institutional set-up: Korea, Spain and the US (Figure 1(e)).11
Quite interestingly, if we except the post-socialist countries (i.e. Poland and
the Czech Republic (Figure 1(f))), on which we will come back later, these
are the only TSs of the 15 compared whose density distribution is above the
bisector for a large range of t values, though still relatively close to it.
4.2 The choice of the cut-o value
To pick up one cut-o only and carry out our analysis with respect to it is
for sure arbitrary to a certain extent. However, by referring to the density
distributions of Figure 1 we are able to both justify its choice and control
or less dense, depending on their distribution being, respectively, above or below it.
11On the \evolutionary" changes occurred in the Korean government research institutes
see Yim and Kim (2005). On the initial, but remarkable, rst steps of the Spanish system
of innovation see European Commission (2006). On the recent shifts in the US funding of
R&D, toward important cuts in defense related spending, and major overlap in public and




Figure 1: Density distribution graphs
12for the robustness of the results.
As for the rst point, we have looked for that cut-o which most enables
us to retain TS structures which are both signicant in structure and not too
dissimilar in density. Indeed, in this way we have tried to further neutralize
scale eects and actually capture pure relational aspects.12
Following this calibration procedure, a reliable reference point for our
analysis has emerged to be the cut-o value t = :0111. Indeed, for t = :0111
we have been able to detect the maximum degree of similarity which is
possible to have far from the extremes, that is (see Table 1): (i) the density
values of the 15 TSs uctuate in a range of :18 (:463   :283), denitively a
small one; (ii) the average dierence among the densities of the 15 TSs is
:02, with a very low variance (:000184); (iii) three groups of TSs, accounting
for 60% of the total (9 out of 15), can be identied for which densities are
equal, or nearly equal (Italy and the US; Australia, Germany and Canada;
Finland and the UK; France and Japan).
Although this appears to us a \satisfactory choice", it remains somehow
arbitrary. The density based method we have used allows us to control for the
robustness of the results obtained when intersectoral techno-economic ows
larger than 1:11% of the total are considered only. In this last respect, we
should clarify that our expectations are for non-robust results. In other words,
given the density-distribution analysis carried out in Section 4.1, we expect
that dierences emerge with respect to the choosen cut-o when techno-
economic ows of dierent size are retained. In this sense, the sensitivity
analysis we will carry out in Section 4.5 will try to check whether some of
the results obtained for t = :0111 hold for other cut-o values too and, more
in general, how they change when ows of a dierent size are considered.
4.3 Technological systems and patterns of clusterization
In order to assess which one of the six alternative structural models outlined
in Section 3.2 better ts the networks of our 15 TSs, we have carried out a
\triad census" on them. The results we got from it are quite incontrovertible
(Table 2).13
At the outset, for all the considered TSs the 2 statistics strongly reject
12By denition, the densities of the compared TSs are all exactly equal, to 1 and 0
respectively, only for the extreme cut-os (min and max) of the threshold distribution. In
the neighborhoods of these cut-os, however, the TSs degenerate in meaningless structures,
either too dense to be investigated (around the minimum cut-o), or too spare to have a
techno-economic meaning (around the maximum). Therefore, the best one can do is to
look heuristically for density similarities, possibly pairwise or across groups of distributions,
by referring to an appropriate intermediate cut-o value.
13On the analysis of triads in Social Network Analysis see, for instance, Wasserman
and Faust (1994, Ch.14). All the calculations were made using Pajek 1.09, a program
package for analysis and visualization of large networks freely available for noncommercial
use (Batagelj et al., 2005).
13Figure 2: Density distribution graph with the chosen cut-o value
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15the null hypothesis of a no balance-theoretic model (Section 3.2, point vi).
All the 15 TSs we have addressed, even those referring to relatively less
developed areas in innovative terms, namely the former socialist countries,
reveal a certain degree of organization into techno-economic clusters. Far
from representing isolated techno-economic \atoms", their constituent sectors
always rank or cluster among them to a certain extent.
More precisely, as it clearly emerges from the relative dierences between
the actual number of triads and that expected by chance, in all the cases
the \ranked clusters model" (Section 3.2, point iii) is the one that better
ts the data. It has to be stressed that these results are quite robust and
do not change signicantly altering the cut-o: the present analysis has
been accomplished for all the cut-os of Section 4.5 and the main results
do not change. Moreover, by means of generalized blockmodeling (Doreian
et al., 2005), the model of ranked clusters has been also tested against the
alternative hypothesis of a core-periphery structure and the former model
has performed better, returning the lowest error score at all the chosen
cut-os. Therefore, in all the 15 TSs investigated, intersectoral clusters of
techno-economic nature emerge in a strongly hierarchical manner.
This is an extremely interesting result, which corroborates the OECD
hypothesis of \reduced systems" within nation-wide innovation systems
(OECD, 1999, 2001).14 Indeed, the division of labour in the innovative
process of national TSs creates groups of sectors whose role, here in terms
of techno-economic diusions, is of dierent importance. Some clusters (we
do not know how many and which yet) are more pervasive than others in
\innervating" the hosting TS, and thus locate at a higher level. Some others
are instead more dependent on external direct techno-economic ows for their
techno-economic role in the same TS, and thus locate at a lower level. In
other words, the 15 TSs we have investigated are in principle quite \complex",
as they host \cohesive" groups of sectors organized into TS-wide hierarchies
which are the most complete in terms of direct techno-economic relationships:
high ranked meso-economic clusters, so to say \pervasive", are so because
the R&D embodied ows which depart from them on average reach directly
all the meso-economic clusters of lower rank, so to say \dependent". On
the other hand, we do not know yet how complex our 15 TSs are. This
requires us to identify for them the actual number of what we have called
truly systemic clusters, a task to which we will dedicate in the following.
14\A national economy consists of several reduced-form innovation systems represented
by various distinct industrial clusters. This implies that any country overall innovation
system would necessarily include composite features of innovation underway in its few-
to-many industrial clusters, depending on the size and the complexity of the national
economy." (OECD, 2001, p.9)
164.4 \Reduced technological systems"(ReTS) in
technological systems (TS)
4.4.1 ReTSs and TS \complexity"
At the outset, let us observe that the present cut-o reduces the \complexity"
of the 15 TSs substantially (Figures 3, 4 and 5). In general, they host just one
cluster which, according to the SC criterion (see Section 3.3), can be qualied
as ReTS.15 In all the TSs, therefore, inherently sub-systemic relationships in
general polarize in just one portion of the correspondent TS. This is a quite
interesting result. Not only is the geographical space of a nation often too
large for a system of innovation to be associated to it, as regional economics
and local studies have realized since long, but the same holds true also for
the techno-economic space of a national economic system: the functional
boundaries of an actual TS are apparently narrower than those delimited by
the input-output table of one country.16
Interesting insights emerge by considering the number of sectors in the
ReTSs identied. The case of Poland (Figure 5(c)), for example, appears
quite idiosyncratic. Apart from two sectors (Sector 1 and 14), all the others
communicate diusely among them in terms of techno-economic ows. To the
point that none of them emerge as pivotal, or core, in the diusion process
with respect to the others. Indeed, not only does the Polish TS appears very
dense, but the correspondent TS is also very \at", as traditionally pivotal
technological sectors, such as for example chemicals (Sector 5) or machinery
and equipment (Sector 11), do not have a higher-level position with respect
to the others.
Still quite interestingly, and with some other exceptions (e.g. Spain),
the TSs with the best recent innovative performances of our group, at
least in terms of R&D intensity in the correspondent years (OECD, 2003),
show ReTSs encompassing at least half of the 16 sectors of the reference
disaggregation, that is: Korea (Figure 3(a)), Japan and Finland (Figures 3(e)
and 3(f)), and the US (Figure 5(b)). Finally, relatively smaller are the ReTSs
which can be identied in the other countries, where the number of sectors
among which techno-economic ows circulate diusely spans from three, in
France (Figure 4(b)) and the Netherlands (Figure 4(a)), to ve, in Norway
(Figure 5(a)). A result that, with the partial exception of France, is in line
with the evidences on the low degree of connectivity of the correspondent
15SCs are identied by groups of nodes with the same color. Of course, the density of a
TS and the number of its ReTS are somehow related: a higher density implies a larger
number of ows above the cut-o, and thus a greater probability to have relationships
which are able to fuel SCs in a network. However, this relationship is just potential and
does not necessarily turn into actual. A glance at the 15 oriented graphs and the illustrative
comparison between France and Japan (with exactly the same density) conrm this point.
16To be sure, three exceptions \conrm" this result, that is, Australia (Figure 3(c)),
Czech Republic (Figure 3(d)), and Italy (Figure 4(f)), where the \reduced TSs" that can
be identied are two, still a low number.
17systems of innovation (Leoncini and Montresor, 2000b; rstavik and N as,
1998).
4.4.2 ReTSs and TS structures
The number and the size of the ReTSs identied provides us with a basis to
detect dierent TS structures and group the 15 TSs themselves accordingly.
A visual inspection of the oriented graphs (Figures 3, 4 and 5) suggests to us
four structures to which a fth group of idiosyncratic ones can be added.17
(i) A rst TS structure we can recognize is that of a \diamond-like" TS,
dominated by a large ReTS, \innervated" by the techno-economic
ows of just one or two higher sectors, and only directly: in relative
terms, such a techno-economic cluster can thus be deemed nearly self-
sucient. Its embodied R&D pervades, to an increasing extent, other
sectors disposed at a number of dierent levels below it, up to a unique
mostly dependent sector (the lower apex of the diamond). Accordingly,
the degree to which the other sectors depend on the ReTS appears
dierentiated.
Although with sectoral dierences, in our application this is the structure
of Korea and Spain (Figures 3(a) and 3(b)), where electrical and optical
instruments (Sector 11), along with other transport equipments (Sector 13)
in Spain, are the only sectors the ReTS needs to draw on for \circulating"
technological ows intensive of natural resources (Sectors 4 and 15), chemicals
(Sectors 5 and 6) and metals (Sectors 8, 9 and 10)).
A sort of degeneration of the diamond structure can also be found in
the cases of Australia and Czech Republic (Figures 3(c) and 3(d)), where
the diamond contour is less \shaped" and an additional two-sector ReTS of
intermediate level is identied. Quite interestingly, motor vehicles (Sector
12) and other transport equipment (Sector 13) \fuel" the higher level ReTS
in the Czech Republic, while they are rather reached by its techno-economic
ows in Australia (at the closest lower level): a sign of the dierent maturity
the means of transport technology has in the two TSs.
(ii) A second, pentagon-like structure can be identied in those TSs with
a large ReTS, \fuelled" by no more than two other sectors as in the
previous case, but, unlike the previous case, both directly and indirectly
by one of them (the upper apex of the pentagon). Accordingly, the
correspondent techno-economic cluster can be deemed less self-sucient
than that of the previous structure. The ReTS still pervades to an
17Of course, the way we have grouped the TS structures is somehow subjective, as
dierent TS clusters could be possibly identied by looking at dierent aspects. In the
following, dierent structures are associated to dierent geometrical gures, with a large
benet of hindsight and a purely recognizing value.
18increasing extent other sectors, but here just at other two dierent levels
below it. Their dependency on the ReTS is thus more homogeneous
than in the previous case.
Although with dierences, such a structure is shared by Japan and Finland
(Figures 3(e) and 3(f)), where a large ReTS receives techno-economic ows
by one pivotal sector only { chemicals (Sector 5), in the Japanese case,
electrical and optical instruments (Sector 11), in the Finnish one { but here
both directly and indirectly. Few are the sectors outside the ReTS { mainly
with a \supplier-dominated" nature (Sectors 14 and 2){ among which we
nd, in both cases, the manufacturing transport sectors (Sectors 12 and 13),
although other transports is mostly dependent in Japan only.
Although non strictly pentagon-like, to this group of TSs we can also
add that of Germany (Figure 4(e)), which diers from that of Finland and
Japan for two variations: the shift of transport equipments (Sector 13) from
below to above the ReTS, a larger \base" of dependent sectors where we
\exceptionally" nd also coke, petroleum and nuclear products (Sector 4).
(iii) A sort of dierent, hexagon-like version of the previous structure, is
represented by TSs whose \reduced TSs" are still \innervated" by two
higher sectors (both directly and indirectly by one of them), but with
a smaller size and innovating a larger number of sectors, to a variable
extent up to a unique maximum dependent sector.
This is the structure of the Dutch and of the French TSs (Figures 4(a) and
4(b)), where electrical and optical instruments (Sector 11), in the former case,
machinery and equipment (Sector 10), in the latter, provide the correspondent
ReTS with substantial techno-economic ows, both directly and indirectly.
Although the technological nature of this three-sector ReTS is quite dierent
in the two cases, and somehow reecting their dierent specialization models,
strong similarities can be identied by looking at their dependent sectors:
in particular, in both cases we nd the non (strictly) manufacturing sectors
(Sectors 15 and 16) of the disaggregation.
(iv) A fourth star-like structure can be associated to the TSs in which the
ReTS has an intermediate size and gets thus innervated, both directly
and indirectly, by a number of sectors which is not much smaller than
those it innervates in turn. Once compared with the previous structures,
its self-suciency is thus lower, while the dependency of the remaining
sectors from it is relatively more homogeneous.
This is the case of Canada and the UK (Figures 4(c) and 4(d)), where
a techno-economic core of 3 and 4 sectors, respectively, is characterized by
heterogeneous (in terms of levels) innovative diusions. In both cases the
ReTS is identied by the metal-based sectors of our disaggregation (Sector
198, 9 and 10) (with the addition of electricity, gas and water supply (Sector
15), in the UK), pointing to the importance of embodied innovation ows in
identifying system clusters.
(v) A nal cluster of TSs is identied by structures which appear relatively
idiosyncratic, and thus heterogeneous both among them and with
respect to the others.
This is, rst of all, the case of the US (Figure 5(b)), out of whose
ReTS we just nd 8 sectors, and along just two other superior and inferior
hierarchical lines. Quite interestingly, these are the 3 most science-based
of the disaggregation (Sectors 5, 11 and 13), which supply the ReTS, and
the 5 most supplier-dominated ones, which are instead supplied by it in
techno-economic terms (Sectors 1, 2, 14, 15 and 16).
Quite idiosyncratic appears also the Polish TS (Figure 5(c)), which in
fact collapses in a sort of super ReTS, from which only two sectors are
excluded as purely dependent: food, beverages and tobacco (Sector 1) and
residual manufacturing (Sector 14). Given the relative small size of the
techno-economic ows retained, this is not necessary inconsistent with the
very poor innovative performances of the country (e.g. in terms of R&D
intensity), where networking among SMEs has been recently put on the top
of the agenda (CIMPAN, 2003).18
Remarkable is also the case of Italy (Figure 4(f)), whose larger ReTS
(out of the two) locates at a quite low level, revealing the presence of a metal-
based sub-system (Sectors 8, 9 and 10), which needs the techno-economic
contributions of a remarkable number of sectors and, in particular, of a
higher-level and smaller ReTS which is based on the energy-based sectors
(Sectors 4 and 15).
Finally, Norway (Figure 5(a)) has a ReTS which locates at an even lower
level than Italy in the correspondent oriented graph. Such a ReTS thus
reveals the need of several techno-economic injections to be set at work,
along with the \capacity" of fueling just one sector (i.e. Sector 4, coke,
rened petroleum products and nuclear fuel) in addition to the usual residual
manufacturing and service sectors (Sector 14, 15 and 16).
4.4.3 ReTSs and cliques
As a way to complement the previous analysis, it might be interesting to
analyze which of the clusters we have identied as ReTS actually qualify
18In 2004, the Polish R&D intensity was 0:53%, just above Mexico and Slovak Republic
(OECD, 2006). However, since the middle '90s the local authorities have been trying
to implement at least the downstream part of a still prospective system of innovation.
The National SME Services Network (KSU) (http://ksu.parp.gov.pl/lista.html), a
group of 180 co-operating business counselling centres all over the country for supporting
development of the SME sector, is the most remarkable example of these eorts.
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Figure 3: Oriented graphs
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Figure 4: Oriented graphs II
22(a) Norway (b) United States
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Figure 5: Oriented graphs III
also as cliques, or contain cliques. In these cases the ReTS is in fact mostly
systemic, since each sector in it both supplies and is supplied by any other.
Quite interestingly, the clique analysis helps in better qualifying the clusters
of TSs of the previous section.
For the present cut-o (t = :0111), cliques can be found in 7 out of the 15
TS considered (in Figures 3-5, whenever present, cliques have been \boxed"
in a rectangular). In the pentagon-like structures (Section 4.4.2, point ii) of
Japan, Finland and Germany, the hexagon-like ones (Section 4.4.2, point iii)
of the Netherlands and France, and in those of Australia, Italy and Norway,
the techno-economic clusters we have identied do not host sectors with
mutual relationships: the ReTs at the core of their TSs do not comprehend
any more systemic \super-core".
As for the other seven TSs, it should be rst noticed that, with the
relevant exception of the Korean TS, the cliques identied always include
some or all of the metal-based sectors of our disaggregation, that is: basic
metals (Sector 8), fabricated metal products (Sector 9) and machinery and
equipment (Sector 10). Given that these are the sectors which most resort
23to embodied kind of technological exchanges, on the basis of which clusters
have been detected, this result was somehow expected. But not necessary,
as the Korean TS shows.
In the \diamond-like" TSs (Section 4.4.2, point i) of Spain and Czech
Republic (Figures 3(b) and 3(d)), these sectors clique along with few others
more { Sectors 5 and 15 in Spain, Sector 11 in the Czech Republic (which
replies Sector 9) { and actually constitute a sort of \super-core" within the
wider ReTS. Of a dierent nature is instead the super-core we nd in the
Korean diamond, exclusively based on energy products (Sector 4), chemicals
(Sector 5) and public-utilities (Sector 15).
In Canada (Figure 4(c)) and the UK (Figure 4(d)), the two \star-like"
structures identied above (Section 4.4.2, point iv), the clique of the three
metal-based sectors actually covers the whole ReTS (which in UK com-
prehends in addition also Sector 15). Conversely, in the two idiosyncratic
structures of Poland (Figures 5(c)) and the US (Figures 5(b)), the same three
sectors constitute a small \island" of reciprocal techno-economic relationships
in two of the widest ReTSs.
4.5 A (sort of) sensitivity analysis
Table 3 reports the number and the composition of the clusters identied for
cut-os other than t = :0111, both below and above it (see also Figure 2).
Once more, these values have been selected in a heuristic way, by looking for
relevant changes in the TS structures.
In general, let us observe that, as expected, very few results are robust
with respect to the size of the techno-economic ows considered. For sure,
this is the case of the Korean TS, whose diamond-like structure persists until
relatively large ows only are retained (t = :0215). Conversely, the ReTS of
the Spanish diamond vanishes more rapidly, although linearly (i.e. with no
structural changes) with the reduction of its density. That of Korea is thus
a TS systemically fuelled by a large ReTS of sectors, from which the others
depend to a hierarchically increasing extent.19
Out of the three pentagon-like structures, the most robust appears that
of Finland, whose ReTS is nearly entirely cliqued for a slightly smaller cut-o
(t = :009) and in which wood, paper and printing (Sector 3) and electricity,
gas and water (Sector 15) remain cyclically related also by retaining quite
large techno-economic ows (e.g. for t = :0292 and t = :0317). Quite
interestingly, unlike in the other TSs, also food, beverage and tobacco (Sector
1) and coke, petroleum and nuclear products (Sector 4) remain networked
19As for the other diamond-like TSs, a two-ReTS structure appears more a trait of the
Czech Republic than Australia, although in the former the clusterization of the techno-
economic space shrinks more rapidly by increasing t, and reduces to the metal-based sectors
of the disaggregation (Sectors 8, 9 and 10). Their clique in the Czech TS is also quite
permanent.
24for a large array of ts. This is another important result, which suggests how
the techno-economic injections of a higher level sector allow to relatively
low-tech ones to enter in cyclical clusters also of a certain importance.20
Among the hexagon-like TSs, the French one emerges for its idiosyncratic
and stable chemical-based cluster (Sector 5 and 6), in which food and
beverages (Sector 1) play a part until too large ows are retained. Conversely,
the Dutch ReTS rapidly shrinks to the usual metal based sectors, which are
however unable to circulate relatively large techno-economic ows.
Sectors 8, 9 and 10 are systematically pivotal also for the star-like
structures of the UK and Canada. To be sure, these two, and the UK in
particular, are the TSs whose systemic techno-economic ows drop more
substantially by departing from t = :0111 as cut-o. As in the Netherlands,
the metal-based ReTS vanishes as a whole when relative large ows only are
considered.
Some nal remarks are due to for the idiosyncratic TS structures. The
US, rst of all, adds to Finland and France as a TS where clusterization
is traceable also for relatively large cut-os (that is, larger than t = :025).
Quite interestingly, however, an important result is that the hierarchical
structure of the American TS is quite sensitive to the size of the retained
techno-economic ows. In particular, we nd cases of sectors which, by
increasing t, leave a ReTS to constitute another \independent" one (consider
Sectors 5 and 11 for t = :005, and Sectors 3 and 6 for t = :0125). The
hierarchical nature of this TS appears thus less structural than that of other
TSs.21
A last interesting result is represented by the Italian TS. Indeed, its
pivotal clustering sectors { that is Sectors 4, 6, 8, 9, 10 and 15 { emerge as
soon as techno-economic ows of a certain relevance are considered (i.e. for
t = :009). By increasing the ow size, rather than shrinking (substantially),
the same cluster decouple into the two ReTSs we have identied for t = :0111,
and remains so also for larger technological exchanges (e.g. for t = :0125).
For even larger ones (e.g. t = :0215), instead, the sectors of the notable
Italian specialization model (i.e. fabricated metal products (Sector 9) and
non-electrical machinery (Sector 10)) remain the only one to enable cyclical
20Let us also observe that, before exiting from the list of the clustered sectors, Sectors 8
and 10 come to constitute in Finland a cyclical relationship distinguished from that based
on Sectors 3 and 15. As for the other \pentagons", while the Japanese ReTS \linearly"
shrinks to a resource-intensive clusters { made up of wood, paper and printing (Sector 3),
electricity, gas and water (Sector 15) and construction (Sector 16) { the German TS looses
its upper ReTS for techno-economic ows of medium size (t = :0125) and shrinks more
suddenly, for larger ones (t = :0215), to a cluster based on motor-vehicles (Sector 12) and
machinery (Sector 10).
21A similar switch can be observed in the Polish TS, where Sectors 3, 15 and 16 separate
from the largest ReTS for t = :0125 before exiting from the clustered portion of the TS,
which vanishes, completely and suddenly, for t = :0215.
25cluster relationships.22
5 Conclusions
Although less visible than the territorial one, the \techno-economic space"
represents an important meso-economic dimension along which innovation ac-
tivities can cluster. Providing the underlying relationships are qualied, these
clusters can actually be seen as \reduced technological systems" (ReTSs),
that is as subsystems which make their hosting technological system (TS)
inherently complex. Accordingly, these subsystems forge the structure of a
national TS and become an inescapable element in evaluating it, especially
in comparative exercises.
By drawing on previous related works, in the paper we have suggested
to \map" the techno-economic space of a certain TS by building up the
correspondent matrix of embodied R&D intersectoral ows. Along the same
research line, we have applied network analysis techniques to these matrices in
order to \scan" the techno-economic space of a TS. As an added-value to the
same literature, instead, we have applied some network-analysis techniques
of social grouping to investigate the patterns according to which innovations
cluster in the techno-economic space, and which of the resulting clusters
actually qualify as systemic in nature (that is, as a ReTS).
Once applied to a set of 15 OECD TSs for the middle '90s, this analysis
provides us with novel insights about the structural similarities and dissimi-
larities that can be detected among them. At the outset, the techno-economic
activities of all these 15 TSs organize hierarchically, with clusters of sectors
of dierent importance in the relative diusion process. Other hypotheses of
clusterization are in fact signicantly rejected.
Interesting results also emerge when, with respect to techno-economic
ows of a given size, clusters are looked for and selected according to the
heterarchical nature of their relationships: that is, when ReTSs are identied
on the basis of the cyclical nature of the relationships which survive by
dichotomizing the relevant intersectoral R&D matrix. Indeed, on this basis,
the 15 TSs can be clustered among them according to oriented graphs
of similar structure, whose meaning only marginally overlaps with what
suggested by other (possibly less systemic) empirical studies. Korea and
Spain, for example, although radically dierent in institutional terms, share a
\diamond-like" techno-economic space dominated by a wide cluster of cyclically
related sectors, drawing on one or two superior sectors and innervating all
the others to an increasingly hierarchical extent.
22A certain robustness is also shown by the Norwegian TS, whose low-level ReTS already
emerges for quite low cut-o values, remains centered on the identied sectors (i.e. Sectors
1, 3, 7, 9 and 13), but just until appreciable techno-economic ows only are considered



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































27As in other related works, the sensitivity of the results to the selected cut-
o value has been considered through an appropriate analysis of the density
distributions revealed by the 15 TSs: this time, for a much larger number
of cut-os. The size of the techno-economic ows has been thus shown to
play an important role in shaping the clusters of the investigated TSs, but
results of a certain robustness have been obtained too. The size-contingent
hierarchical structure of the US TS, for example, contrasts the structural
conguration displayed by the Korean one.
In concluding, the question of how to relate the results of this paper with
others on the TSs (or the NSIs) we have investigated should be claried. As
we have repeatedly shown, some of the results of our analysis can be read by
considering the embodied and input (R&D) nature of the innovation ows
we have retained. Some others are instead related to what we know about
the specialization model of the relevant country, both in terms of production
and innovation. In general, however, given the special features of the techno-
economic space we have referred to, the analysis of innovation clustering we
have pursued oers new results which should be used in integrating, rather
than supporting or contrasting, previous and future knowledge about the
structure and functioning of TSs.
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Label Sector ISIC Rev.3 Codes
S1 Food products, beverages and tobacco 15-16
S2 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 17-19
S3 Wood, paper, printing, publishing 20-22
S4 Coke, rened petroleum products and nuclear fuel 23
S5 Chemicals (including pharmaceuticals) 24
S6 Rubber and plastics products 25
S7 Other non-metallic mineral products 26
S8 Basic metals 27
S9 Fabricated metal products (except machinery and equipment) 28
S10 Machinery and equipment, nec 29
S11 Electrical and optical instruments 30-33
S12 Motor vehicles, trailers and semitrailers 34
S13 Other transport equipment 35
S14 Manufacturing, nec; recycling 36-37
S15 Electricity, gas and water supply 40-41
S16 Construction 45
32